

Automated Facial Age Estimation

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NTIA
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


What is automated facial age estimation


How old are these people?



Estimated Age: 46
True Age: ??




Estimated Age: 26
True Age: 32



Estimated Age: 16
True Age: 32


Age Estimation Accuracy & Error over Large Homogeneous Population of 6M



For the most accurate algorithm, 67% of estimates are accurate within 5 years with a Mean Absolute Error (MAE) of 4.3 years.

Age Estimation Accuracy & Error by Age Group


— B30D — B31D — E30D — E31D — E32D — F30D — K10D — P30D — Q10D



Age Group	Num Images	B30D	B31D	E30D	E31D	E32D	F30D	K10D	P30D	Q10D
0-17	1605807	2.6	3	5.3	5.4	5.3	18.6	21	6.1	10.9
18-55	3781607	4.9	4.5	5.5	5.5	4.6	5.6	6.6	7.6	7
56-100	785287	6.2	5.8	13.9	14	9	14.7	14	16.7	10.9

Mean Absolute Error (years)

Age Estimation Accuracy & Error by Gender



Mean Absolute Error (years)

Gender	Female	Male
Num Images	118108	124894
B30D	5.7	4.7
B31D	5.9	4.7
E30D	8.5	6.1
E31D	8.6	5.8
E32D	6.2	4.8
F30D	11.2	10.2
K10D	11.9	9.9
P30D	11.6	8.5
Q10D	9.5	8.2

Results:

All algorithms estimate age more accurately on males than females.

Face Recognition Accuracy By Age Group

Identification miss rates by age group


- » Older ← [56,120]
- » Parents ← [31,55]
- » Young ← [20,30]
- » Teen ← [14,19]
- » Pre ← [9,13]
- » Kid ← [4,8]
- » Baby ← [0,3]

Visa images:

Enrolled size, N = 19972

Mated searches = 19972

Non-mated searches = 203082



One-to-many “miss rate”

FNIR when threshold set to produce a false positive in only 1 in 100 non-mate searches (FPIR = 0.01)


Accuracy = F(Age, Ageing)

- » Baby ← [0,3] Mean time lapse = 1.6
- » Kid ← [4,8] Mean time lapse = 3.0
- » Pre ← [9,13] Mean time lapse = 3.9
- » Teen ← [14,19] Mean time lapse = 2.7
- » Young ← [20,30] Mean time lapse = 2.0
- » Parents ← [31,55] Mean time lapse = 2.1
- » Older ← [56,120] Mean time lapse = 2.2


Accuracy by age group :: Summary

- » Using visa photographs, younger people, especially but not limited to children, are more difficult to recognize.
- » Lifelong trend to be more easily recognized. This is a big effect, larger than other drivers in face recognition.
- » Two effects:
 - **Repeatability:** Older people more easily recognized as themselves.
 - **Distinguishability:** Older people more easy to distinguish from others.

Face Visa Data :: Accuracy(Age, ΔT)



Face Visa Data :: Accuracy(Age, ΔT)





Face Ageing Quantification + Relevance

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Information Access Division
National Institute of Standards and Technology

NTIA Meeting, Washington, DC
Thursday, November 6, 2014

Ageing: Permanent Appearance Change



Dwight D Eisenhower



ALGORITHM X

0.647

0.601

0.599

0.579

ALGORITHM Z

0.595

0.578

0.565

0.548

Green

indicates successful 1:1 authentication at FMR = 0.001.

Red

indicates failure.

FACE AGEING → DECREASED SIMILARITY.

IS THERE AN ANALOGOUS EFFECT FOR OTHER MODALITIES?



Photographs on exhibit at
Museum of Modern Art, NYC

See Susan Minot's text in
NY Times Magazine
Sunday Oct 3 2014

40 years



The Brown Sisters

Photographed every year from
1975-2014

Ageing

Brown Sister #1



T ~ 5



T ~ 10



T ~ 20



T ~ 30



T ~ 40 Years



THREE
LEADING
COMMERCIAL
FR
ALGORITHMS

0.632

0.608

0.584

0.602

0.576

Y

3004

2954

2755

2845

2781

Z

0.622

0.616

0.613

0.517

0.426

Ageing

Brown Sister #2



T ~ 5



T ~ 10



T ~ 20



T ~ 30



T ~ 40 Years

FR
ALGORITHM

X

0.648

0.601

0.600

0.610

0.605

Y

2863

2821

2758

2752

2824

Z

0.617

0.593

0.506

0.531

0.533

Ageing

Brown Sister #3



T ~ 5



T ~ 10



T ~ 20



T ~ 30



T ~ 40 Years



FR

ALGORITHM

X

0.673

0.635

0.627

0.607

0.586

Y

2847

2649

2687

2637

2630

Z

0.610

0.511

0.524

0.595

0.472

Ageing

Brown Sister #4



T ~ 5



T ~ 10



T ~ 20



T ~ 30



T ~ 40 Years



FR

ALGORITHM

X

0.652

0.654

0.603

0.591

0.578

Y

3055

2795

2743

2847

2607

Z

0.632


0.516

0.475

0.524

0.432

Verification over 40 years



Reasoning about Ageing

- » The simplest conception of ageing is that:
 - Accuracy = F(Time-of-Enrollment – Time-of-Recognition) = F(ΔT)
- » And we all ageing “steadily”:
 - Accuracy = a - b ΔT *“if we’re lucky, or simplistic, linear ageing”*
- » Inexorable change: *“It’s a one way street, and downhill at that”*
 - Accuracy = F(monotone(ΔT))
 - Modulo cosmetics(?), botox(?), surgery(?) and ... photoshop
- » But at least it’s graceful:
 - Accuracy = F(slowly varying function(ΔT , n))
 - Absent injury, disease, abuse
- » But ... complications
 - Unsteady ageing: *“Five years at 30 is not five years at 40”*
 - Accuracy = F(Age-at-Enrollment; ΔT) or, simple Taylor expansion,
 - Accuracy = F(Age-at-Enrollment, Age-at-Recognition)
 - Person-specific ageing: *“Some age better than others”*
 - Accuracy_i = F_i(Age-at-Enrollment, Age-at-Recognition) subscript i

Longitudinal Analysis

Quantifying Permanence Using Data from
a Large-Population Operational System

Ageing :: Longitudinal data

Brad Wing



ALGORITHM E20A

0.617

0.578

0.532

0.541

ALGORITHM J20A

0.589

0.587


0.579

0.569

Green indicates successful 1:1 authentication at FMR = 0.001.
Red indicates failure.

LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS APPLIED TO ALGORITHM SCORE DATA


Quantify ageing :: Individual recognition scores over time



- » Often, visually flat
- » Considerable variance within subject
- » Considerable variance between subjects
- » Irregular sampling
- » Imbalanced sampling
- »  Mixed effects models
 - Shared population part
 - Individual part

TRAJECTORIES INDICATE HETEROGENEITY – INTERCEPTS (AND GRADIENTS) VARY WITH QUALITY OF THE ENROLLMENT IMAGE cf. DODDINGTON's ZOO

Quantifying permanence via mixed-effects regression



Model for the j -th score from the i -th eye

$$HD_{ij} = \pi_{0i} + \pi_{1i}T_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$$

Intercept is sum of population average term, the *fixed effect*, and an eye-specific *random effect*

$$\pi_{0i} = \gamma_{00} + \psi_{0i}$$

Slope is sum of population average term, the *fixed effect*, and an eye-specific *random effect*

$$\pi_{1i} = \gamma_{10} + \psi_{1i}$$

↑ Permanence stated by the population wide rate at which scores are decreasing.

Subject to assumptions:

$$\epsilon_{ij} \sim N(0, \sigma_{\epsilon}^2)$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \psi_{0i} \\ \psi_{1i} \end{bmatrix} \sim N \left(\begin{bmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}, \begin{bmatrix} \sigma_0^2 & \sigma_{01}^2 \\ \sigma_{10}^2 & \sigma_1^2 \end{bmatrix} \right)$$

MIXED EFFECTS MODEL RESPECT IDENTITY INFORMATION. SIMPLE LINEAR REGRESSION, IN YELLOW, DOES NOT AND HAS OTHER PROBLEMS

Conclusions

- » Brown sisters: existence proof that 1:1 face authentication is possible over thirty years
 - But scores become weaker.
 - Successful 1:N identification demands stronger scores
- » No good long term face ageing studies. e-Passports and digital photography will change that... eventually.
 - And suitable longitudinal analysis methods are published (NIST, MSU)
- » But, there's a "so what" for some use cases:
 - Algorithms improve on a timescale shorter than ageing
 - Identity credentials are re-issued on a timescale shorter than ageing
 - But possibility to recycle old photos
 - Law enforcement + counter terrorism functions have no such luxury



FR in Video :: Scope



Face In Video Evaluation (FIVE)

NIST

Goals

- » Comparative accuracy of algorithms
- » Absolute accuracy
- » Comparative computational cost
- » Iterative development with tech. providers
- » Threshold calibration
- » How to analyze + metrics → ISO/IEC 30137-2
- » Failure analysis → ISO/IEC 30137-1

Out-of-scope

- » Re-identification
- » Anomaly detection
- » Detection of un-coop, evasion
- » Other modalities + non-human

S2S – V2S – S2V – V2V :: Watchlist Surveillance




Challenges for FR

- » Pose
 - Compound rotation of head to optical axis
- » Resolution
 - Range to subject
 - Legacy camera
 - Adverse compression for storage or transmission
 - Motion blur

Surveillance Video Related to Boston Bombings




Off angle recognition: The problem for video



S2S – V2S – S2V – V2V

Search = Mugshot

Enrolled = Video corpus, e.g. Youtube




Example applications:

1. Media search
2. Asylum re-identification

Patrick Grother, National Institute of Standards & Technology, USA

S2S – V2S – S2V – V2V



Search = Video corpus

Enrolled = Video corpus



David Cameron appears on David Letterman

Example applications:

1. Identity clustering
2. Re-identification

Thanks

patrick.grother@nist.gov

Time variation in three modalities

Iris

- » Healthy
 - Blink occlusion
 - Gaze direction
 - Dilation varies with mood, consumption, ambient light
- » Cosmetic
 - Contact lenses
 - Glasses
- » Ageing
 - Pupil constriction
 - Palpebral aperture
- » Disease

Fingerprint

- » Healthy
 - Facial expression
 - Mouth movement
 - Head motion, head orientation
 - Facial hair
- » Cosmetic
 - Moisturizers
- » Ageing
 - Arthritic fingers

Face

- » Healthy
 - Facial expression
 - Mouth movement
 - Head motion, head orientation
 - Facial hair
- » Cosmetic
 - Makeup
- » Ageing
 - Soft tissue folds
 - Stoop – pitch forward