Survey of Existing SBOM Formats and Standards - Version 20191025

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Background & Problem Statement

Modern software systems involve increasingly complex and dynamic supply chains. Unfortunately, the composition and functionality of these systems lacks transparency; this contributes substantially to cybersecurity risks, alongside the cost of development, procurement, and maintenance. This has broad implications in our interconnected world; risk and cost affect collective goods, like public safety and national security, in addition to the products and services upon which businesses rely.

The NTIA Software Transparency Working Group on Standards and Formats was formed to assess available current formats for software bills of materials as well as forward-looking use-cases identified by other working groups or communities of practice. The working group investigated existing standards, formats and initiatives as they apply to identifying the external components and shared libraries (proprietary or open source) used in the construction of software products. The group analyzed efforts already underway by other groups related to communicating this information in a machine-readable manner.

We propose that increased supply chain transparency can reduce cybersecurity risks and overall costs by:

- Enhancing the identification of vulnerable systems and the root cause of incidents
- Reducing unplanned and unproductive work
- Supporting more informed market differentiation and component selection
- Reducing duplication of effort by standardizing formats across multiple sectors
- Identifying suspicious or counterfeit software components

Collecting and communicating this information in such a manner can lower the cost, increase the reliability of, and increase our ability to trust our digital infrastructure.

The initial goals of this working group were to:

- Investigate the options available today
- Document workable and actionable machine-readable formats
- Acknowledge that no single solution/format will be required (i.e., we will not “proclaim a winner”)
- Determine how the solutions can work in harmony, since different formats were designed

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1 This working group operated in parallel and coordination with three other efforts in the NTIA multistakeholder process on Software Component Transparency: a working group devoted to defining the baseline SBOM requirements and definitions, a working group documenting use cases and benefits of software transparency, and a working group designing and executing an initial, early-stage proof of concept for the medical device industry and their hospital customers. The working groups and the broader community of interest met in person or virtually approximately every two months from July 2018 to September 2019. More information about the process is available here: https://www.ntia.doc.gov/SoftwareTransparency The related documents are available at https://ntia.gov/SBOM.
to address the requirements of different constituencies (e.g. developers, CFOs managing software entitlements), and mapping between well-documented formats is technically feasible.

- Support international feedback and buyin to solutions as supply-chain security and software integrity is not just a US problem, and participation in this process is global.

Two key formats

The working group identified two formats in widespread use: Software Package Data eXchange (SPDX), an open source machine-readable format stewarded as a de facto industry standard by the Linux Foundation, and Software Identification (SWID), a formal industry standard used by various commercial software publishers. Descriptions and use cases for each format, as well as a mapping between them, are detailed below.

It is important to note that although these two formats contain overlapping information, they are typically used at different points in the software life cycle, and are consumed by different types of users. SPDX, a product of the open source software development community, is geared for ease-of-ingestion within a developer workflow. The open source nature of the format, as well as the availability of open source tooling to generate it, supports broad adoption by a large and distributed population of commercial international organizations, as well as developers who may not be associated with vendors. The accessibility of SPDX means that the sole developer of an experimental library can generate an SBOM with minimal effort at no cost. These cost saving and ready availability of open source tools is attractive to commercial organizations as well. SPDX is useful in the “long tail” of upstream open source software componentry.

SWID tags were designed with software inventory and entitlements management in mind. SWID tags support the inventory of commercial and open source software that is installed on a device through locating the SWID tag associated with the software. A developer can use freely-available guidance on the creation of SWID tags to configure their build pipeline to produce SWID tags automatically during the software build and packaging process. With an orientation around deployed software, SWID tags follow the binary and are updated as the compiled codebase changes. This lends itself to integration with automated scanning, and a host of risk-management use cases and tooling.

This document and this working group acknowledge that both formats can be used to generate, exchange, and use SBOM data. While certain use cases may lend themselves to particular formats, this working group does not endorse either specifically, and believes that each user should select that which meets their needs. This document offers an explicit guide to translate between the two for the “minimum viable” SBOM models to enable a more interoperable ecosystem.
Lifecycle of an SBOM

How to produce SBOM?

Information that goes into SBOMs can be best obtained from the tools and processes used in each stage of the software lifecycle (See Figure 1, below). One may leverage existing tools and processes to generate SBOMs. Such tools and processes include intellectual property review, procurement review and license management workflow tools, code scanners, pre-processors, code generators, source code management systems, version control systems, compilers, build tools, continuous integration systems, packagers, compliance test suites, package distribution repositories and app stores.

Figure 1: The Software lifecycle with multiple stages where underlying code might change, and thus the SBOM would be updated to reflect the changes.
Currently, not all off-the-shelf or open source software lifecycle tools have the capability to generate SBOMs. Analysis of software may happen after initial generation. Suppliers should consider enhancing or retrofitting existing tools and processes to generate and maintain SBOMs.

SBOMs may be considered incomplete if some information about the materials added or removed through the stages of software lifecycle is missing, or was never recorded. If the SBOMs are incomplete, suppliers should make that clear so that consumers can make informed use of SBOMs based on the available data.

How to deliver SBOMs?

At the moment, there is no set single way to transmit SBOM data downstream to the next user. In open source products, the SBOM data can be stored as metadata, with pointers to components. For compiled software, SBOMs can be bundled together with the software product itself as a compendium and stored with the installed software. The data could also be made available in portals controlled by the supplier or some other third party.

Stakeholders mentioned the potential value in accessing data from older SBOMs, so that users can understand the underlying components of software at a specific point in time. For example, a customer may want to know if a cloud-based service was potentially vulnerable at a certain point in the past as part of a forensic breach investigation. This document does not offer guidance on how to preserve past SBOMs.

How to update SBOM?

An SBOM should reflect the current state of a piece of software. If software or the software’s underlying components are updated, then the list of underlying components should also be updated accordingly to ensure that SBOM data itself is up-to-date. Except for the information that is derived from the software artifact itself, other information in SBOM can be declarative, or asserted by the author of the SBOM data. For example, the download location of the component names can be part of the SBOM.

Similarly, if the information known about the software changes, or an error was made in the original SBOM, a supplier may update the SBOM without updating the underlying code. Declared information may have to be corrected, changed, or added over time. Such changes can be appended to ledger-based SBOMs (see, e.g., the SPARTs project in Related Formats section). Errata may have to be supplied and carried forward with a specific SBOM.

How to consume SBOMs?

For the most effective use of SBOM information, the data must be machine readable. Consumption must incorporate machine-to-machine automated processes. Each of the use cases discussed in the introduction (and further fleshed out in the Use Case document) can only
achieve maximum effectiveness by integrating into automated processes. It is also important that the format can be translated into a human readable version.

Consumers may use SBOMs as input to their tools that support:

- asset management
- license and entitlement management
- intellectual property management
- regulatory and compliance management
- provisioning
- configuration management
- vulnerability management
- incident response

Usage of SBOMs for risk management may require additional risk data that may not be included with SBOMs.
Overview of Key Formats

**SPDX**

The Software Package Data Exchange (SPDX®) specification provides a standard language for communicating the components, licenses, copyrights, and security information associated with software components in multiple file formats.

Software development teams across the globe use the same open source components, but in 2010, there was little infrastructure available to facilitate collaboration or analysis, or to share the results of analysis activities. As a result, many groups were performing the same work, leading to duplicated efforts and redundant information. To save time, and improve data accuracy, the SPDX project was formed to create a common data exchange format so that information about software packages and related content could be collected and shared.

An SPDX document can be associated with a particular software component or set of components, an individual file, or even a snippet of code. The SPDX project focuses on creating and extending a “language” to describe the data that can be exchanged as part of a software bill of materials, and be able to express that language in multiple file formats (RDFa, .xlsx, .spdx and soon .xml, .json, .yaml) so that information about software packages and related content may be easily collected and shared with the goal of saving time and improving accuracy.

The specification is a living document. As new use-cases are examined, it evolves. Care is taken to provide backwards compatibility. Development progresses through collaboration between technical, business and legal professionals from a range of organizations to create a standard that addresses the needs of various participants in the software supply chain.

Companies and organizations (collectively “Suppliers”) are widely using and reusing open source and other software components. Accurate identification of the software is key to understanding if there may be a security vulnerability in it.

**Description**

The [SPDX specification](#) describes the necessary sections and fields to produce a valid SPDX document. It is important to note that not all of these sections are required in every document. The only one that is mandatory is to have a “Document Creation Information” section for each document. Then it’s a matter of using the sections (and subset of the fields in each section) that describe the software and metadata information you’re planning to share.
Each SPDX document can be composed from the following:

- **Document Creation Information**: One instance is required for each SPDX file produced. It provides the necessary information for forward and backward compatibility for processing tools (version numbers, license for data, authors, etc.)

- **Package Information**: A package in an SPDX document can be used to describe a product, container, component, packaged upstream project sources, contents of a tarball, etc. It’s a way of grouping together items that share some common context. It is not necessary to have a package wrapping a set of files.

- **File Information**: A file’s important metadata, including its name, checksum licenses and copyright, is summarized here.

- **Snippet Information**: Snippets can optionally be used when a file is known to have some content that has been included from another original source. They are useful for denoting when part of a file may have been originally created under another license.

- **Other Licensing Information**: The SPDX license list does not represent all licenses that can be found in files, so this section provides a way to summarize other license information that may be present in software being described.

- **Relationships**: Most of the different ways that SPDX documents, packages, files can be related to each other can be described with these relationships.

- **Annotations**: Annotations are usually created when someone reviews the SPDX document and wants to pass on information from their review. However, if the SPDX
document author wants to store extra information that doesn’t fit into the other categories, this mechanism can be used.

Each document is capable of being represented by a full data model implementation and identifier syntax. This permits exchange between data output formats (RDFa, tag:value, spreadsheet), and formal validation of the correctness of the SPDX document. In the SPDX specification 2.2 release, the additional output formats of JSON, YAML and XML are planned to be supported. Further information on the data model can be found in Appendix III of the SPDX Specification and on the SPDX web site.

Use Cases

- SBOM for software components
- Tracking of intellectual property (licensing, copyright) of software components
- Listing contents of a software distribution
- Container contents inventory
- Associating CPEs with specific packages
- Identifying provenance of lines of code embedded in files.

Key Features

- Documented artifacts can be checked using the provided hash values
- Rich facilities for intellectual property and licensing information
- Flexible model able to scale from snippets and files up to packages, containers, and even operating system distributions
- Ability to add mappings to other package reference systems.

SPDX and SBOM

SPDX documents can capture SBOM data because they are able to represent all of the components found in traditional software development and deployment. SPDX documents are being used to represent distro .iso images, containers, software packages, binary files, source files, patches, and even snippets of code embedded in other files. A rich set of relationships is available to link the software elements together within documents, as well as between documents. An SPDX document is able to link out via external references to NVD and other packaging systems metadata.

Future Directions

- Information to indicate when/where/how known vulnerabilities have been remediated in an update or patch.
- Enhancing the representation of pedigree and provenance information during chain of custody discussions.
- Identification of use cases currently not able to be represented by an SPDX document and adding elements into the upcoming releases to support these use cases.
SWID Tag

Description
Software Identification (SWID) Tags were designed to provide a transparent way for organizations to track the software installed on their managed devices. It was defined by ISO in 2012 and updated as ISO/IEC 19770-2:2015 in 2015. SWID Tag files contain descriptive information about a specific release of a software product.

The SWID standard defines a lifecycle: a SWID Tag is added to an endpoint as part of the software product’s installation process, and deleted by the product’s uninstall process. In this lifecycle, the presence of a given SWID Tag corresponds directly to the presence of the software product that the Tag describes. Multiple standards bodies, including the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) use SWID Tags in their standards.

To capture the lifecycle of a software component, the SWID specification defines four types of SWID tags: primary, patch, corpus, and supplemental. (See Figure 3)

1. **Primary Tag**: A SWID Tag that identifies and describes a software product is installed on a computing device.

2. **Patch Tag**: A SWID Tag that identifies and describes an installed patch which has made incremental changes to a software product installed on a computing device.

3. **Corpus Tag**: A SWID Tag that identifies and describes an installable software product in its pre-installation state. A corpus tag can be used to represent metadata about an installation package or installer for a software product, a software update, or a patch.

4. **Supplemental Tag**: A SWID Tag that allows additional information to be associated with any referenced SWID tag. This helps to ensure that SWID Primary and Patch Tags provided by a software provider are not modified by software management tools, while allowing these tools to provide their own software metadata.

Corpus, primary, and patch tags have similar functions in that they describe the existence and/or presence of different types of software (e.g., software installers, software installations, software patches), and, potentially, different states of software products. In contrast, supplemental tags furnish additional information not contained in corpus, primary, or patch tags.

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2 While ISO documents sit behind a paywall, anyone can freely use ISO-standardized specifications. See NIST Internal Report (NISTIR) 8060: *Guidelines for the Creation of Interoperable Software Identification (SWID) Tags* for a detailed explanation and guide of SWID tags.
FIGURE 3 - The Lifecycle of software on an endpoint documented by SWID tags. Source: NISTIR 8060

The figure above illustrates the steps in the software lifecycle and the relationships among those lifecycle events supported by the four types of SWID tags. Supplemental tags can be associated with any other tag to provide additional metadata that might be of use. Taken as a body, SWID tags can support a wide range of functions, including software discovery, configuration management, and vulnerability management.

The following is an example of a primary SWID tag for a piece of compiled software by the ACME Corporation called Roadrunner Detector. The tag defines the product name, version, and other details, as well as a hash for the binary.

```xml
<SoftwareIdentity
xmlns="http://standards.iso.org/iso/19770/-2/2015/schema.xsd"
name="ACME Roadrunner Detector 2013 Coyote Edition SP1"
tagId="com.acme.rrd2013-ce-spl-v4-1-5-0"version="4.1.5">
  <Entity name="The ACME Corporation" regid="acme.com"
      role="tagCreator softwareCreator"/>
  <Link rel="license" href="www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt"/>
  <Meta product="Roadrunner Detector" colloquialVersion="2013"
      edition="coyote" revision="sp1"/>
  <Payload>
    <File name="rrdetector.exe" size="532712"
        SHA256:hash="a314fc2dc663ae7a6b6bc6787594057396e6b3f569
cd50fd5d4b41bbaf2b6a"/>
  </Payload>
</SoftwareIdentity>
```
Use Cases

- SBOM for software components
- Continuous monitoring of installed software inventory
- Identifying vulnerable software on endpoints
- Ensuring that installed software is properly patched
- Preventing installation of unauthorized or corrupted software
- Preventing the execution of corrupted software
- Managing software entitlements

Key Features

- Provides stable software identifiers created at build time
- Standardizes software information that can be exchanged between software providers and consumers as part of the software installation process
- Enables the correlation of information related to software including related patches or updates, configuration settings, security policies, and vulnerability and threat advisories.

SWID tags and SBOM

SWID tags can be used as an SBOM, since they provide identifying information for a software component, a listing of files and cryptographic hashes for the constituent artifacts that make up a software component, and provenance information about the SBOM (tag) creator and software component creator. Tags can explicitly link to other tags, enabling a representation of a dependency tree.

The operational model for generating SWID tags allows the tags to be generated as part of the build and packaging process; this allows a SWID tag-based SBOM to be produced automatically when the related software component is packaged.

Future Directions

While SWID tags are an XML format, a more lightweight representation called CoSWID, a Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)-based binary representation of SWID tag information, is currently being standardized in the IETF to support the constrained IoT use case. More information on CoSWID can be found below.
Translation and Harmonization Guidance

Experts in SPDX and SWID engaged in a mapping exercise between the data fields in the two formats. Not all the fields evenly mapped to each other, as the formats were originally designed for different purposes. However, the Working Group found the potential for decent interoperability, as enough of the fields correspond with each other. This is particularly true for those fields related to the basic component data discussed in the Framing Group’s draft work.

Below, we lay out those basic data fields that are similar to what is described as the “Baseline Component Information.” To illustrate this, we offer a toy example that captures many of the features of basic SBOM in both SPDX and SWID.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Represented in SPDX</th>
<th>Represented in SWID</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>(3.5) PackageSupplier:</td>
<td>&lt;Entity&gt; @role (softwareCreator/publisher), @name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>(3.1) PackageName:</td>
<td>&lt;softwareIdentity&gt; @name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique Identifier</td>
<td>(3.2) SPDXID:</td>
<td>&lt;softwareIdentity&gt; @tagID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Version</td>
<td>(3.3) PackageVersion:</td>
<td>&lt;softwareIdentity&gt; @version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>(3.10) PackageChecksum:</td>
<td>&lt;Payload&gt;/../&lt;File&gt; [@hash-algorithm]:hash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hash Relationship</td>
<td>(7.1) Relationship: CONTAINS</td>
<td>&lt;Link&gt;@rel, @href</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBOM Author</td>
<td>(2.8) Creator:</td>
<td>&lt;Entity&gt; @role (tagCreator), @name</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: A mapping between SPDX and SWID to capture the core fields discussed in the “baseline component information” SBOM.

Example Scenario

The goal of a toy example is to demonstrate how a Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) can look in a fairly lightweight fashion. Our example, illustrated in Figure 4, focuses on an imaginary piece of software called “Application” by an organization named Acme. Acme’s Application includes exactly two third party components, Bob’s Browser and Bingo Buffer. Bob’s Browser, in turn, depends on third party components. We know that the
Browser includes Carol’s CompressionEng, but we don’t know if the Browser includes other components as well. Carol’s CompressionEng, in turn, is written from scratch, and we know that it contains no third party components. Unfortunately, we don’t know if Acme’s asoftware’s other dependency, Bingo Buffer, contains any third party dependencies.

Figure 4: A toy example of software to illustrate how an SBOM can look.

Example in SPDX

SPDXVersion: SPDX-2.1
DataLicense: CC0-1.0
DocumentNamespace: http://www.spdx.org/spdxdocs/8f141b09-1138-4fc5-aecb-fc10d9ac1eed
DocumentName: SBOM toy example
SPDXID: SPDXRef-DOCUMENT
Creator: Organization: NTIA Standards and Formats Workgroup
Created: 2019-08-31T11:29:46Z
Relationship: SPDXRef-DOCUMENT DESCRIBES SPDXRef-asoftware-v1.1

PackageName: asoftware
SPDXID: SPDXRef-a software-v1.1
PackageVersion: 1.1
PackageSupplier: Organization: Acme
PackageDownloadLocation: NOASSERTION
FilesAnalyzed: false
PackageChecksum: SHA1: 75068c26abbed3ad3980685bae21d7202d288317
PackageLicenseConcluded: NOASSERTION
PackageLicenseDeclared: NOASSERTION
PackageCopyrightText: NOASSERTION
Relationship: SPDXRef-asoftware-v1.1 CONTAINS SPDXRef-Browser-v2.1
Relationship: SPDXRef-asoftware-v1.1 CONTAINS SPDXRef-Buffer-v2.2

PackageName: Browser
SPDXID: SPDXRef-Browser-v2.1
PackageVersion: 2.1
PackageSupplier: Person: Bob
PackageDownloadLocation: NOASSERTION
FilesAnalyzed: false
PackageChecksum: SHA1: 94568c26abbed3ad3980685deaf1d7202d268314
PackageLicenseConcluded: Apache-2.0
PackageLicenseDeclared: NOASSERTION
PackageCopyrightText: Copyright 2019 Bob
Relationship: SPDXRef-Browser-v2.1 CONTAINS SPDXRef-CompressionEng-v3.1

PackageName: Buffer
SPDXID: SPDXRef-Buffer-v2.2
PackageVersion: 2.2
PackageSupplier: Organization: Bingo
PackageDownloadLocation: NOASSERTION
FilesAnalyzed: false
PackageChecksum: SHA1: 84568c26aabed3ad3980685beef1d7202d26831d
PackageLicenseConcluded: NOASSERTION
PackageLicenseDeclared: GPL-3.0-or-later
PackageCopyrightText: Copyright 2018 Bingo Inc.

PackageName: CompressionEng
SPDXID: SPDXRef-CompressionEng-v3.1
PackageVersion: 3.1
PackageSupplier: Person: Carol
PackageDownloadLocation: NOASSERTION
FilesAnalyzed: false
PackageChecksum: SHA1: 63568c26aebad3ad398bb85ce1f1d7202d27731a
PackageLicenseConcluded: NOASSERTION
PackageLicenseDeclared: NOASSERTION
PackageCopyrightText: NOASSERTION

Example in SWID

```xml
<SoftwareIdentity xmlns="http://standards.iso.org/iso/19770/-2/2015/schema.xsd"
    name="asoftware"
    tagId="acme/asoftware@1.1"
    version="1.1">
    <Entity name="acme" role="tagCreator softwareCreator" />
    <Link href="swid:bob/browser@2.1" rel="requires" />
    <Link href="swidd:bingo/buffer@2.2" rel="requires" />
    <Payload xmlns:sha512="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512">
        <File name="acme-asoftware-1.1.exe"
            sha512:hash="BC55DEF8453898754536AE47CC907387B8F61D9ACD7D3FB8B8A624199682C8FBE6D1631088AE6A322CDDC4252D3564655CB234D3818962B0875C35504D55689" />
    </Payload>
```
<SoftwareIdentity xmlns="http://standards.iso.org/iso/19770/-2/2015/schema.xsd"
  name="browser"
  tagId="bob/browser@2.1"
  version="2.1">
  <Entity name="bob" role="tagCreator softwareCreator" />
  <Link href="swid:carol/compressionEng@2.2" rel="requires" />
  <Payload xmlns:sha512="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512">
    <File name="bob-browser-2.1.exe"
      sha512:hash="FF4893471E763B94165CC277A9FB01D7ED6256FDDDD6467D91E35AFF8F445C6312832FD97DE1FD517606019BDC5F46E9E4E4814601E1FCB1010E90C2E8E54820" />
  </Payload>
</SoftwareIdentity>

<SoftwareIdentity xmlns="http://standards.iso.org/iso/19770/-2/2015/schema.xsd"
  name="buffer"
  tagId="bingo/buffer@2.2"
  version="2.2">
  <Entity name="bingo" role="tagCreator softwareCreator" />
  <Payload xmlns:sha512="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512">
    <File name="bingo-buffer-2.2.lib"
      sha512:hash="AEE705CEAFDBA5EE54462443E41A447FDA69BDEC857FC4C284D41AD67C7499A8F10C37B504A11896A3DF29564B3DB64B783C3B18BFA0F2AA4C779477A9D0D8" />
  </Payload>
</SoftwareIdentity>

<SoftwareIdentity xmlns="http://standards.iso.org/iso/19770/-2/2015/schema.xsd"
  name="compressionEng"
  tagId="carol/compressionEng@3.1"
  version="3.1">
  <Entity name="carol" role="tagCreator softwareCreator" />
  <Payload xmlns:sha512="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha512">
    <File name="carol-compressionEng-3.1.lib"
      sha512:hash="BBB0E94E089B34ADAA04A55A338AE268672CA69ABB34C79E14B446D0DD5F55B0E34FC9F9D7DDF0655C6CDAB878604625805648FADA6E897541F483B2E92AE424C" />
  </Payload>
</SoftwareIdentity>
Future work on SBOM formats

One use case defined by the Framing Working Group is to be explicit about what is known and unknown in the SBOM. That is, the consumer of an SBOM should have insight into when components have no further subcomponents, versus when a component may have further subcomponents, but no information either way is asserted by the supplier.

To date, neither SWID nor SPDX can explicitly capture and communicate this “known unknowns” use case. Members of both support communities are looking into how the formats can be modified to convey this information.

More broadly, tracking third party dependencies is related to a number of other key challenges in software engineering and computer science. These challenges include:

Software Identifier challenges

In order to automatically and accurately correlate information about a single component between multiple tools, systems or databases there is a need for a ‘primary key’ that unambiguously and uniquely identifies software components. Such identity key should not change over time and should not require a central issuing authority. There is also a need to determine this identify key based on the software component itself when no other information is available.

While there are some widely used approaches (such as CPE), these are not universal, and does not meet the complete needs detailed above. There has been research to develop more complete identifiers (e.g., Package URL and software heritage IDs), but currently they are not widely used. More effort is required to mature these formats, and make them relevant to the entire ecosystem. The medium term solution will probably look like a federated model with different communities defining their own rules, and some alias databases to harmonize for specific uses.

Tooling challenges

Broader adoption of SBOM practices will require automation, which in turn requires tools. A broader survey of existing tools and their capabilities is essential to demonstrate and promote production, distribution and use of SBOM data. This may require an ongoing community effort to maintain a catalog of such SBOM tools. More research is required to catalog software package information formats native to software development stacks, packaging tools, and software repositories and map them to common standards.
SBOM Delivery and Distribution challenges

Free and openly available SBOM data is considered essential for enabling better supplier selection, so consumers can compare SBOMs before purchasing a product. There is a benefit in standardizing on a set of methods for consumers to obtain SBOMs from suppliers via standard contact points such as sbom-request@example.com or http://example.org/sbom. Existing standards do not make a recommendation on these methods. Data Licenses in the SBOM itself should be considered.

Software Component Modification

Some suppliers may take a specific software component and make a particular change. This could be done for customization, for back-porting, or further editing, curation or better support of the code. Technically, this is fork in the code base, but since much of the original code remains, the consumer of SBOM data may still wish to know about the underlying codebase. Changes and remediations be documented in the standards described above. In SPDX, it is an “annotation;” in CycloneDX it is “pedigree;” in SWID it could be represented by a “Link” to the original source.

SBOM formats for higher trust and provenance

High security assurance systems cannot be built on assumed trust. Trust comes from being able to independently verify what is being claimed about software components in an SBOM. Verification of SBOM components may require tracing components as far back in the chain of custody or prior history as possible. Standardization of information required to perform such assessments still needs to be further studied and understood.
Related Formats Surveyed

When the NTIA working group started the discussion of bill of materials, the following formats were also suggested to be considered for identifying software. The workgroup worked with creators of these projects to identify the key elements, and the summaries are captured below. Links where those who are interested, can find more information are provided.

CoSWID Tag

Description:
The Concise SWID (CoSWID) tag specification is an alternate format for representing a SWID tag using the Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR). A SWID tag, expressed in XML, can be fairly large. The size of a SWID tag can be larger than acceptable for use in constrained devices use cases (e.g., IoT). While containing the same information as a SWID tag, CoSWID tags reduce the size of a SWID by a significant amount. This size reduction is supported by using integer labels in CBOR in place of human-readable strings for data elements and commonly used values.

Use Cases
As an alternate representation of a SWID tag, CoSWID shares the same use cases as a SWID tag. Due to the reduced size, a CoSWID tag better supports implementation of these use cases for IoT and other constrained devices and networks.

Key Features
A CoSWID shares the same features of a SWID tag. This format reduces the footprint of a SWID tag, while expressing the same information. The following is an example of a CoSWID tag, in hex-based binary:

```
bf0f65656e2d5553207820636f6d2e61636d652e72726432031332d63652d737032
d76342d312d352d30cc2410101783041434d4520526f616472756e6e65722046574
6563746f722032030313320436f796f746520496e666f64657320546167652061736c
652e636f6d2e61636d6520706f726174696f6e20536563736869796c652e61636d652e
bf0f6d2e61636d652e72726432031332d63652d737032
d76342d312d352d30cc2410101783041434d4520526f616472756e6e65722046574
6563746f722032030313320436f796f746520496e666f64657320546167652061736c
652e636f6d2e61636d6520706f726174696f6e20536563736869796c652e61636d652e
```

The CoSWID format is described by [https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sacm-coswid/](https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-sacm-coswid/). This IETF draft is nearing publication as an IETF RFC.
The CoSWID in CBOR is 317 bytes in size, while the SWID tag in XML is 795 bytes in size. This represents a 60.1% reduction in size, while expressing the same information in both tags.

The following is a more human-readable representation of the CBOR encoding of the example CoSWID:

```
BF                                      # map(*)
  0F                                   # unsigned(15)
  65                                   # text(5)
    656E2D5553                        # "en-US"
  20                                   # negative(0)
  78 20                                # text(32)
    636F6D2E61636D652E72764323031332D63652D7370312D76342D312D352D30 #
"com.acme.rrd2013-ce-spl-v4-1-5-0"
  0C                                   # unsigned(12)
C2                                   # tag(2)
  41                                # bytes(1)
    01                             # "\x01"
  01                                   # unsigned(1)
  78 30                                # text(48)
41434D4520526F616472756E65722044656774653746F72203230313320436F6E205350312D76342D312D352D30 #
974696F6E20535031 # "ACME Roadrunner Detector 2013 Coyote Edition SP1"
  0D                                   # unsigned(13)
  65                                   # text(5)
    342E312E35                        # "4.1.5"
  0E                                   # unsigned(14)
  20                                   # negative(0)
  02                                   # unsigned(2)
BF                                      # map(*)
  18 1F                                # unsigned(31)
  74                                   # text(20)
    546865204143D4520436F72766F726174696F6E20535031 # "The ACME Corporation"
  18 20                                # unsigned(32)
  68                                   # text(8)
    61636D652E636F6D                    # "acme.com"
  18 21                                # unsigned(33)
  9F                                   # array(*)
    01                                # unsigned(1)
    20                                # negative(0)
  FF                                   # primitive(*)
  FF                                   # primitive(*)
  04                                   # unsigned(4)
BF                                      # map(*)
  18 26                                # unsigned(38)
  78 23                                # text(35)
```
Survey of Existing SBOM Formats and Standards - Version 20191025

```
687474703A2F2F7777772E676E752E6F72672F6C6963656E7365732F67706C2E747874
# "http://www.gnu.org/licenses/gpl.txt"
18 28  # unsigned(40)
  67  # text(7)
  6C6963656E7365  # "license"
  FF  # primitive(*)
05  # unsigned(5)
BF  # map(*)
18 2D  # unsigned(45)
  64  # text(4)
  32303133  # "2013"
18 2F  # unsigned(47)
  66  # text(6)
  636F796F7465  # "coyote"
18 34  # unsigned(52)
  73  # text(19)
  526F616472756E65722044657463746F72  # "Roadrunner Detector"
18 36  # unsigned(54)
  63  # text(3)
  73031  # "sp1"
  FF  # primitive(*)
  06  # unsigned(6)
BF  # map(*)
11  # unsigned(17)
BF  # map(*)
18 18  # unsigned(24)
  6E  # text(14)
  72726465746573746F722E657865  # "rrdetector.exe"
14  # unsigned(20)
  1A 200820E8  # unsigned(537403624)
  07  # unsigned(7)
  9F  # array(*)
  01  # unsigned(1)
  58 20  # bytes(32)
      A314FC2DC663AE7A6B6BC6787594057396E6B3F569CD50FD5DD84D1BBAFD2B6A
# "/xA3\x14\xFC-\xC6c\xAEzk\xC6xu\x94\x05s\x96\xE6\xB3\xF5i\xCDP\xFD]\xDBM\e\xBA\xFD+j"
  FF  # primitive(*)
  FF  # primitive(*)
  FF  # primitive(*)
  FF  # primitive(*)
```
CPE

A related data format is the Common Platform Enumeration (CPE\(^4\)). This format is “a standardized method of describing and identifying classes of applications, operating systems, and hardware devices present among an enterprise’s computing assets”. The CPE is used in various situations such as the National Vulnerability Database (NVD). CPE enables identification of specific applications, with or without version numbers, but does not by itself identify subcomponents.

CycloneDX

CycloneDX is a lightweight SBOM specification designed specifically for software security requirements and related risk analysis. The specification is written in XML with JSON in development. It’s designed to be flexible, easily adoptable, with implementations for popular build systems. The specification encourages use of ecosystem-native naming conventions, supports SPDX license IDs and expressions, pedigree, and external references. It also natively supports the Package URL specification and correlating components to CPEs.

The project is open source, Apache 2.0 licensed, and encourages the development of schema extensions to enhance it’s base capabilities.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Represented in CycloneDX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Supplier</td>
<td>publisher</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component</td>
<td>name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unique Identifier</td>
<td>bom/serialNumber and component/bom-ref</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Version</td>
<td>version</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Component Hash</td>
<td>hash</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relationship</td>
<td>(Nested assembly/subassembly and/or dependency graphs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SBOM Author</td>
<td>bom-descriptor:metadata/manufacture/contact</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Example in CycloneDX

```xml
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<bom serialNumber="urn:uuid:3e671687-395b-41f5-a30f-a58921a69b71" version="1"
 xmlns="http://cyclonedx.org/schema/bom/1.1"
 xmlns:dg="http://cyclonedx.org/schema/ext/dependency-graph/1.0"
```

Grafeas

Grafeas is an open artifact metadata API to audit and govern your software supply chain. It provides a common language to store, retrieve, and query metadata on software artifacts. By supporting metadata for common use-cases, it aims to provide streamlined composability and portability for artifact metadata.

Metadata is grouped into two types: notes and occurrences. Notes are created by metadata provider in provider’s project and contains context-insensitive metadata relevant to linked occurrences. Occurrences are created by in customer’s project and link to provider notes. To illustrate how notes and occurrences work together, consider a vulnerability (CVE). When a CVE is created, it is recorded as a note by a metadata provider. If a CVE applies to a particular artifact, an occurrence is generated. In a similar manner, notes and occurrences are generated and applied to record the following types of metadata: package, builds, images, attestations, and deployments.

in-toto

Description:

in-toto is a framework to cryptographically secure the broader software supply chain. To do so, it allows actors to create cryptographically-verifiable pedigree and provenance information for artifacts as they flow throughout the chain. In the context of a Software Bill of Materials, in-toto link metadata (i.e., signed attestations) allow parties to create a certificate of the software artifact that can be shared with consumers.

in-toto link metadata files have a very flexible format, that can be as descriptive as needed. An in-toto link contains the following fields:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Example</th>
<th>Mandatory?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>name</td>
<td>An arbitrary identifier for this certificate.</td>
<td>“build-gcc”</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>command</td>
<td>Information about the command that created this certificate.</td>
<td>“gcc -c foo.c”</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Materials</td>
<td>A list of artifacts consumed when creating this software and their checksum</td>
<td>“foo.c: {sha256: ...}”</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Products</td>
<td>a list of artifacts produced and their checksum</td>
<td>“foo: {sha256: …}”</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Byproducts</td>
<td>Information produced during the creation of products</td>
<td>{“return-value” 0, “stderr”: ””}</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environment</td>
<td>Any relevant environment information such as environment variables, system time, host integrity checks, etc.</td>
<td>{“LANG=en_US-UTF8”}</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Signature</td>
<td>A cryptographic signature over the previous fields.</td>
<td>{ &quot;keyid&quot;: &quot;12c55...&quot;, &quot;method&quot;: &quot;RSASSA-PSS&quot;, &quot;sig&quot;: &quot;a0d3237a52...&quot; }</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

in-toto has been successfully deployed in a myriad of environments, from large-scale cloud monitoring providers such as Datadog, to widely-adopted open source projects such as Debian.

Package-URL (purl)

Description:
A package URL (purl) is an attempt to standardize existing approaches to reliably identify and locate software packages. A purl is a URL string used to identify and locate a software package in a mostly universal and uniform way across programming languages, package managers, packaging conventions, tools, APIs, and databases. Such a package URL is useful to reliably reference the same software package using a simple and expressive syntax and conventions based on familiar URLs.

A purl is a URL composed of seven components:

```
scheme:type/namespace/name@version?qualifiers#subpath
```

Components are separated by a specific character for unambiguous parsing.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Usage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>scheme</td>
<td>This is the URL scheme with the constant value of &quot;pkg&quot;. One of the primary reasons for this single scheme is to facilitate the future official registration of the &quot;pkg&quot; scheme for package URLs.</td>
<td>Required</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Components are designed such that they can form a hierarchy, from the most significant component on the left, to the least significant components on the right.

A purl must NOT contain a URL Authority; i.e. there is no support for username, password, host and port components. A namespace segment may sometimes look like a host, but its interpretation is specific to a type.

**Examples**

pkg:deb/debian/curl@7.50.3-1?arch=i386&distro=jessie  
pkg:docker/gcr.io/customer/dockerimage@sha256:244fd47e07d1004f0aed9c  
pkg:gem/ruby-advisory-db-check@0.12.4  
pkg:golang/google.golang.org/genproto#googleapis/api/annotations  
pkg:maven/org.apache.xmlgraphics/batik-anim@1.9.1?packaging=sources

Information above was extracted from: [https://github.com/package-url/purl-spec](https://github.com/package-url/purl-spec)

**Linkage**

SPDX: Next version of the specification (2.2) will formally recognize PURL’s as valid External References `<type>`, and can be captured today via `<type>` of OTHER.

SWID: A PURL can be provided in a SWID tag using the “link” element.

**SEVA**

SEVA (Software EViidence Archive) is a hardened XML SBOM format developed and maintained by Ion Channel, primarily for high assurance systems in critical infrastructure that must be maintained on discontiguous networks. SEVA is engineered for transfer of signed assurance data across one-way data guards in an auditable fashion, to maintain continuity of assurance for components and applications running on networks that are not connected to the Internet. Because SEVA is implemented as a NIEM-compliant ([https://www.niem.gov/](https://www.niem.gov/)) format, the format can be externally verified and extended or restricted in a verifiable manner.
Linkage: SPDX is working with Ion Channel to include the SEVA information for documenting security use cases to the next version of the specification (2.2).

Software Heritage Index

Description:
Software Heritage is a non profit initiative actively supported by a large number of organizations—software, systems and tool vendors, IT users, academic and governmental institutions. It is building a universal archive of software source code, as a common infrastructure catering to a variety of use cases from industry to science and culture.

Use Cases:
One of the use cases specifically listed on their mission statement is source code tracking for industry: “Because industry cannot afford to lose track of any part of its source code, we track software origin, history, and evolution. Software Heritage will provide unique software identifiers, intrinsically bound to software components, ensuring persistent traceability across future development and organizational changes.”

These intrinsic identifiers are based on cryptographic signatures, have a precise formal definition and are already available for the more than 10 billions of artefacts stored in the Software Heritage archive. They are an essential building block for ensuring integrity of a source code base, and are currently being used by some major industry players to implement a part of their SBOM workflow, related to source code distribution obligations, as well as from the Wikidata community.

Linkage
SPDX: Next version of the specification (2.2) will formally recognize SWH IDs as valid External References <type>, and can be captured today via <type> of OTHER.

SParts

Description:
The Software Parts (SParts) project delivers a hyperledger, based on Sawtooth, that enables determination of the chain of custody of all the software parts from which a product (e.g., IoT device) is comprised of. The ledger provides both access to and accountability for software meta information of software parts exchanged among manufacturing supply chain participants. A software part is any software component that could be represented as one or more files. (e.g., source code, binary library, application, an operating system runtime, container, ...).

Use Cases:
An envelope of information can be used to summarize pedigree and provenance of software through multiple hops in the supply chain. An envelope can contain SPDX, SWID and other SBOM information. Participants pass these envelopes from producer to consumer throughout the supply chain adding in the metadata for their contributions to the envelopes.
SPDX-Lite

Description:
SPDX-Lite is a profile for a set of existing SPDX fields that the OpenChain Project Working group is recommending be used when collecting data via spreadsheets from organizations that do not have sophisticated tracking of software provenance in place. As the fields form a valid SPDX-document, the translation tools can be applied to turn the spreadsheet into other machine readable formats.

This subset has been agreed to be documented and adopted as an official profile, into the SPDX 2.2 specification as an Appendix.

Use Cases:
A spreadsheet containing the SPDX-Lite profile fields can be requested by companies from their suppliers who are hardware companies and unfamiliar with software and open source software licensing.
About the authors of this document

This document was drafted by an open working group convened by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration in a multistakeholder process, including the following individuals and organizations: Chris Clark (Synopsys), Robin Gandhi (University of Nebraska at Omaha), Christopher Gates (Velentium), Art Manion (CERT Coordination Center), Bob Martin (MITRE), Chandan Nandakumaraiah (Juniper Networks), Brendan O’Connor (GitHub), Kate Stewart (Linux Foundation), JC Herz (Ion Channel), Tim Walsh (Mayo), David Waltermire (NIST), Steve Springett (OWASP)

Others participated, but do not wish to be named.